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INTRODUCTION

An extensive network of laws, including tax incentives, aims to
increase corporate efforts toward socially desirable goals. Although
there has been a significant debate in the literature regarding the
appropriateness or even possibility of corporate social responsibility
given the corporate structure,1 the federal government has continued to
seek increasing corporate social responsibility through the reach of its
laws.2
There are several areas in which global companies have been
encouraged to exhibit increased corporate social responsibility. These
include labor standards, environmental stewardship,3 and recognition of
human rights,4 with implications for important issues like global poverty,
eradication of worldwide diseases, and reduction of violence in conflict
regions.5 Corporate social responsibility may entail promotion of ethical
guidelines, incorporation of stakeholder concerns, and efficient
internalization of externalized costs.6 This differs from corporate
accountability, which includes internal monitoring mechanisms,
transparency, and disclosure.7
There are two primary but different methods of controlling
behavior, whether it is the behavior of individuals or corporations: to
incentivize it or to regulate it. Governments are in a unique position to
employ either or both options because of their ability to pass regulatory
1. “For centuries legal, political, social, and economic commentators have debated
corporate social responsibility ad nauseam.” Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why
They Give at the Office: Shareholder Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual
Theory of the Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 1195 (1999) (emphasis omitted).
2. This coincides, or may be prompted, by an increased call by society for corporate
social responsibility. “The growing popularity of corporate social responsibility (‘CSR’) is
premised on the belief that modern corporations have the financial resources, human capital,
and global influence to advance progressive causes.” Aaron K. Chatterji & Barak D.
Richman, Understanding the “Corporate” in Corporate Social Responsibility, 2 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 33, 33 (2008).
3. See, e.g., Cherie Metcalf, Corporate Social Responsibility as Global Public Law: Third
Party Rankings as Regulation by Information, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 145, 146 (2010).
Environmental stewardship includes matters such as “environmentally responsible products
and production methods, responsiveness to community concerns, recycling, conservation,
waste management practices, and energy conservation.” Id. at 151.
4. See id. at 150.
5. See Chatterji & Richman, supra note 2, at 33.
6. Amiram Gill, Corporate Governance as Social Responsibility: A Research Agenda, 26
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 452, 458, 461 (2008).
7. Id. at 458, 461. Gill suggests that corporate social responsibility and corporate
accountability are merging. Id.
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schemes and to extend tax incentives. The question, therefore, arises
whether desirable corporate behavior should be incentivized or
regulated.
This Article analyzes why legislators may choose to incentivize
versus regulate corporate behavior, examining the issue through the
case of the conflict minerals provision in the Dodd–Frank Act.
Accordingly, Part II examines the goals and effectiveness of mandated
corporate social responsibility, using recent conflict minerals legislation
as a case study. Part III analyzes the alternative of incentivization,
focusing on tax regulation. Finally, Part IV compares the two methods
of controlling corporate behavior, seeking a framework governing their
uses.
II. REGULATING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR
Corporations deal with numerous regulations every day, including
regulations aimed at requiring good corporate citizenship or social
responsibility. These regulations, often tailored to corporations in
particular industries, regularly are in tension with the overriding
corporate priority of maximizing profit for shareholders. Positive law
plays a major role in establishing standards and boundaries for
corporate behavior. In addition, a number of regulations aimed at
increasing corporate social responsibility require corporate disclosure of
behavior, with the result that consumers and the market force shifts in
corporate behavior. Both avenues of directing corporate behavior have
benefits and drawbacks but represent the wide range of tools the
government has in shaping corporate behavior and encouraging
corporate social responsibility.
A. Positive Law Governing Corporate Social Responsibility
Promoting and mandating corporate social responsibility through
regulation is not a new concept.8
However, corporate social
responsibility is often considered a moral imperative rather than a
regulatory one.9
As such, efforts to regulate corporate social
8. See, e.g., David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN.
L. REV. 1 (1979).
9. Case Study: Corporate Social Responsibility in the US, TRIPLE PUNDIT (Mar. 21,
2011),
http://www.triplepundit.com/2011/03/case-study-corporate-social-responsibility/,
archived at http://perma.cc/UA28-UFDY/ (claiming that corporate social responsibility
regulations are framed as a social and moral choice). Notably, many industries in the United
States are not as heavily regulated as their European counterparts. Id.; see also Jan Wouters
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responsibility are often based upon a particular issue or social cause and
are often met with resistance from those who do not consider the
particular issue to be paramount.10 For that reason, there exists a
patchwork of corporate social responsibility regulations as a result of the
various resources and lobbying efforts made on behalf of particular
social goals.11
For example, one of the most prominent areas of corporate social
responsibility has been in the field of environmental law and practices.
This is in large part due to the fact that the history of the corporate
social responsibility movement parallels the environmental movement.12
As the Earth Day movement came about in 1970, so too arose the
populist cry for corporations to enlist in solving some of society’s
problems, given the seemingly vast amount of corporate resources and
the perception that corporations played a significant role in many of
society’s environmental ills.13
Through resulting environmental regulations and the creation of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to police environmental
& Leen Chanet, Corporate Human Rights Responsibility: A European Perspective, 6 NW. U. J.
INT’L HUM. RTS. 262 (2008) (discussing the regulatory and voluntary approaches to corporate
social responsibility and addressing corporate efforts related to international human rights
issues); see also Laura Albareda et al., The Changing Role of Governments in Corporate
Social Responsibility: Drivers and Responses, 17 BUS. ETHICS: EUR. REV. 347 (2008)
(describing government’s role in regulating corporate social responsibility in three European
countries—Italy, the United Kingdom, and Norway—that all employ different approaches).
10. See Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance,
81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1432–33 (2006); see also Douglas M. Branson, Corporate
Social Responsibility Redux, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1207, 1221 (2002) (noting that corporate social
responsibility is regulated by a variety of statutes and regulatory bodies, including the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, the Community Reinvestment Act, the Freedom of Information
Act, and Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA)).
11. See Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance “Reform” and the New Corporate
Social Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 643 (2001); see also Z. Jill Barclift, Corporate
Social Responsibility and Financial Institutions: Beyond Dodd–Frank, BANKING & FIN.
SERVICES POL’Y REP., Jan. 2012, at 13, 15 (“Many financial institutions choose from several
initiatives to satisfy corporate social responsibility goals: the elimination of poverty, human
rights, workplace diversity, philanthropic contributions, community outreach, and
environmental sustainability.”).
12. Branson, supra note 11, at 611. The discussion over the role of the corporation in
general has been around since at least the 1930s, however. As early as 1932, Adolf Berle and
E. Merrick Dodd debated whether the corporation’s purpose was solely for profit
maximization or whether the corporation also should hold social and community
responsibilities. See, e.g., A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A
Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932).
13. Branson, supra note 11, at 611.
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regulations, corporations were required to increase their corporate
social responsibility as related to the environment.14 Through the
positive law of environmental regulations, corporate social responsibility
is not merely encouraged but mandated through threat of governmental
sanction. That is, corporations are liable to the government, as well as
at risk for potential shareholder derivative suits, if they do not comply
with federal and state environmental laws.15
Likewise, other statutory provisions require corporate social
responsibility in the area of human rights. For example, the Alien Tort
Claims Act allows private rights of action against multinational
corporations committing human rights abuses abroad.16 Thus, although
corporations with overseas operations may not encounter direct U.S.
government oversight abroad, they still face the potential of private
lawsuits for human rights abuses.
Another avenue by which the government regulates corporate
actions requires companies to comply with various corporate social
responsibility measures before being granted licenses for various
business activities.17 This method is used in these contexts as a
regulatory tool.
14. Terra Pfund, Corporate Environmental Accountability: Expanding SEC Disclosures
to Promote Market-Based Environmentalism, 11 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 118 (2004)
(discussing the EPA’s role in ensuring corporate compliance with environmental protection
laws and arguing for regulation).
15. One need not look any further than the recent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico to see
the potential ramifications of violating environmental laws. BP faces lawsuits from the
government, as well as private civil claims. Margaret Cronin Fisk & Jef Feeley, BP Found
Grossly Negligent in 2010 Gulf of Mexico Spill, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 4, 2014, 7:18 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-04/bp-found-grossly-negligent-in-2010-gulfof-mexico-spill, archived at http://perma.cc/PA89-TYPD. The environmental disaster put a
spotlight on existing environmental laws, with many arguing for increased measures to hold
corporations accountable. See Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit:
Rethinking Corporate Social Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster,
85 TUL. L. REV. 983, 1033–34 (2011) (discussing regulatory reforms under Dodd–Frank that
benefit environmental concerns).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); see also William Bradford, Beyond Good and Evil: The
Commensurability of Corporate Profits and Human Rights, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 141, 159–65 (2012); Ronen Shamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort
Claims Act: On the Contested Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 635 (2004) (analyzing lawsuits brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act against
multinational corporations for alleged human rights violations and the resulting effect).
17. Gill, supra note 6, at 469–70. Gill cites the policies and actions of administrative
agencies like the SEC, OSHA, and EPA that, for example, “grant business licenses and
permissions conditioned upon integrity and disclosure performance, [enforce] whistleblower
protections, [provide] government-sponsored auditing schemes and tax incentives, and use[] a
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Requiring corporate compliance with various normative regulations
aimed at shoring up corporate social responsibility is the most direct
governmental influence on corporate behavior due to the threat of
sanction. Also providing an important tool for governments in
regulating corporate behavior are regulations requiring disclosure, as
described in more depth below.
B. Disclosure Requirements
In addition to governmental and private rights of action for
violations of statutorily mandated corporate social responsibility,
corporations are held to socially responsible standards through various
regulations requiring corporate disclosure.18 For public companies,
disclosure occurs on a regular basis and must include any information
deemed material, as well as any information that is statutorily required
to be disclosed.19 For example, companies must make initial disclosures
when new securities are issued to the public.20 Thereafter, public
companies must make periodic disclosures quarterly and annually.21
Disclosures are also required regarding elections at annual shareholder
meetings,22 as well as when any major corporate event takes place, such
as a merger or sale of the business.23
Disclosures unrelated to corporate financial stability and instead
aimed at providing investors with information regarding various social
company’s implementation of a compliance program as a basis for sentencing guidelines” as
meta-regulation related to corporate social responsibility. Id. at 469–70.
18. Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate
Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999). In this article, Williams outlines that
the SEC has the statutory authority in fashioning proxy disclosure to require disclosure either
to promote the public interest or to protect investors. Id. at 1199; see also Jeff Civins & Mary
Mendoza, Corporate Sustainability and Social Responsibility: A Legal Perspective, 71 TEX.
B.J. 368, 370–71 (2008). Civins and Mendoza discuss how specific SEC regulations regarding
corporate reporting may impact corporate social responsibility in the environmental realm,
noting the difference between mandatory reporting and laws governing truth in disclosures.
Id. But see Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an
Institutional Approach to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613, 616 (2006)
(querying whether “the First Amendment shield[s] politically tinged corporate speech from
the compelled disclosure and reporting requirements embedded in the U.S. securities laws”).
19. .See Securities Act of 1933 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012)).
20. See id. §§ 5, 7, 10 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77g, 77j).
21. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 12, 13, 15D (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78l, 78m, 78o-6).
22. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 14(f), 15 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78-n(f), 78o).
23. Id. § 14 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78-n).
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responsibility issues are becoming more prevalent.24 Regulations
requiring additional disclosure often are enacted after a precipitating
event pressured Congress to tighten up its regulatory scheme in relation
to corporations. For example, the collapse of Enron and WorldCom
ushered in the era of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes–
Oxley).25 Likewise, Congress reacted to the financial crisis of 2008 by
enacting sweeping financial reforms in the form of the Dodd–Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd–
Frank).26 Although both Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank were
corporate regulations aimed at increasing financial stability, both Acts
also included disclosure requirements aimed at enhancing corporate
social responsibility.27 In addition, there are numerous regulations
promulgated by discrete agencies regulating particular industries that
require disclosure to ensure compliance, such as the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, the Environmental Protection
24. The disclosure regime required by the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 is premised on the notion that disclosure allows for both investor
protection and an adequate valuation of securities. Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and
Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities
Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 145–46 (2006) (“The emphasis in securities law on
providing information to the public is premised on the belief that individuals are rational, selfgoverning actors who are willing and able to process the information wisely. If we assume
that investors are rational risk calculators who are consistently capable of weighing the costs
and benefits of risky alternatives and selecting the best option, then a system of disclosure
makes good sense.”). For publicly traded companies, disclosure requirements are triggered if
the company learns of any material information, defined as information that would factor into
a reasonable investor’s investment decision. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
231–32 (1988). With additional non-financial disclosure requirements being statutorily
mandated, there is an ongoing debate that Congress and regulating agencies are requiring
disclosure of non-material information, rendering the concept of materiality to be more of a
check-the-box requirement rather than a qualitative, common law concept. See, e.g., Karen
E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s New Role as Diplomatic and
Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315 (2012).
25. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code);
see Mark A. Buchanan, Social Contract, Corporate Social Responsibility, Counsel and the ISO
26000 Guidance on Social Responsibility, ADVOCATE, Oct. 2009, at 17, 18 (“The Sarbanes–
Oxley Act of 2002 also can be seen as a modification of the social contract in that it increases
the duties owed to stakeholders in terms of corporate governance.”).
26. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of the U.S. Code).
27. For example, as discussed in Part II.D, Dodd–Frank included disclosure
requirements related to conflict minerals. In addition, Dodd–Frank required disclosures
related to legal payments made abroad by companies in the extractive industries, as well as
disclosures related to mine safety—all of which are unrelated to the underlying financial goals
of the Act. Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1502–1504, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213–22
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(p)–(q), 78m-2).
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Agency, and Health and Human Services.28 Even if some disclosure
requirements do not carry strict penalties related to the content of the
disclosure, the fact of mandated disclosure forces companies to focus on
performing due diligence and remaining in compliance with
regulations.29
C. The Use of Market Forces
Socially responsible corporate behavior can be induced also by
threat of a negative market reaction.30 A decline in brand recognition or
a blow to a corporation’s reputation affects a corporation’s bottom line
and can be as effective a threat to encourage corporate social
responsibility as any government mandate.31
More and more,
consumers demand products that are made in socially responsible ways
and corporations that act in socially responsible ways.32 In doing so,
consumers create market forces that pressure companies into acting
responsibly.33
There is a tension within corporate management between catering to
customers in order to preserve brand reputation and maximizing profits
28. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1904 (2014); 40 C.F.R. § 61.153 (2014); 21 C.F.R. § 201.62
(2014).
29. For example, companies that must make conflict mineral disclosures may state in
their disclosure that they use conflict minerals, without any threat of SEC sanction. Cf.
Dodd–Frank Act, § 1502 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)). However, the fact
that the company has to perform due diligence and be aware of supply chain issues is a step
towards additional corporate social responsibility.
30. See David Monsma & Timothy Olson, Muddling Through Counterfactual Materiality
and Divergent Disclosure: The Necessary Search for a Duty to Disclose Material Non-Financial
Information, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 137, 184 (2007) (“Brand reputation, among other business
incentives, drives companies to manage areas that lie beyond regulatory compliance and
tangible financial relevance.”).
31. See id.; Ribstein, supra note 10, at 1452–56, 1459. But see Jason Scott Johnston,
Signaling Social Responsibility: On the Law and Economics of Market Incentives for
Corporate Environmental Performance (Univ. of Pa. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper
No. 05-16, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=725103, archived at http://perma.cc/D5
H6-W9V3 (arguing that, in the absence of mandatory disclosure, most firms will engage only
in “cheap talk” that does not permit meaningful comparisons between firms in an industry).
32. See, e.g., Chatterji & Richman, supra note 2, at 48; see also Williams, supra note 18,
at 1199 (explaining that there is an “affirmative case for expanded corporate social
transparency and for the SEC’s legitimate role in promoting such transparency, both from the
perspective of the ‘economic’ investor . . . and from the perspective of the ‘social’ investor,
who is concerned more broadly with the social and environmental effects of corporate
conduct”).
33. See Rob Harrison, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Consumer Movement, 13
CONSUMER POL’Y REV. 127, 128 (2003).
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for shareholders.34 In fact, one of the predominant views in the debate
over the role of corporate social responsibility is that of “shareholder
primacy,” whereby corporate managers “recognize the importance of
corporations serving the interests of society as a whole,”35 but only to
the extent that any mandatory corporate social responsibilities are
embodied in positive law, as described in Part II.A. In other words, the
shareholder primacy theory holds that corporate managers have no
social responsibility beyond profit maximization for shareholders, within
the contours of existing laws.36 A stark view of this theory would posit
that corporations take on social responsibility when they do what they
do best—contribute to the economy by creating employment
opportunities, providing goods and services, and generating tax
revenue.37
Juxtaposed with the shareholder primacy theory is that of
stakeholder primacy.38
Stakeholder primacy is a predominantly
progressive theory that espouses the view that corporate managers have
an underlying social obligation to stakeholders including employees,
consumers, the environment, and the larger community.39

34. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law,
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441 (2001); see also Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the
Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005). This article discusses the economic and social
benefits of limiting corporate profits in the public interest and the existing limits on
managerial discretion to limit shareholder profits. Id. The author concludes that
“[m]anagerial discretion to sacrifice corporate profits is both inevitable and affirmatively
desirable.” Id. at 868.
35. Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic
Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 713 (2002).
36. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962). Friedman,
of course, is essentially the godfather of conservative and libertarian economic theory,
positing that government should not play a role in regulating business or labor practices
because government intervention undermines the capitalistic structure of the economy. See
id. at 22–27. Friedman, however, did not advocate for profit maximization though illegal or
unethical methods. Id. at 133.
37. See Barnali Choudhury, Serving Two Masters: Incorporating Social Responsibility
into the Corporate Paradigm, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 631, 655–65 (2009) (outlining various
methods and devices for deviating from profit maximization, including (1) the business
judgment rule, (2) fiduciary duties, and (3) shareholder proposals). Choudhury also considers
that market forces would motivate a corporation to engage in corporate social responsibility.
See id. at 648–55.
38. Williams, supra note 35, at 716.
39. See id.; see also PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
The theory of stakeholder primacy is manifested more in European regulations, which tend to
hold corporations to higher socially responsible standards than the United States. See Peter
Nobel, Social Responsibility of Corporations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1255, 1258–59 (1999);
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Scholars espousing both the shareholder primacy theory and the
stakeholder primacy theory recognize the role that markets play in
corporate behavior because of the potential to affect shareholder value
and the economic value of the corporation.40 Markets can be seen as
“authentic norms,” gleaned from consumer views and social trends.41
Corporations, therefore, have economic reason to follow market
demand, which is often in the form of consumer demand, but can also be
affected by general societal values.42
Finally, market pressure also can include pressure from international
counterparts, both governmental and corporate. As noted earlier,
European regulations often are stricter than those of the United States
in relation to certain issues concerning corporate social responsibility.43
Stricter regulations elsewhere can result in regulatory arbitrage, with
capital fleeing toward less regulated markets, but it also can result in
pressure to raise the global standard. In other words, organizations like
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
often promulgate global standards for a variety of social regulations, and
member states—of which the United States is one—are expected to
have domestic regulations follow the OECD’s guidelines.44
D. Case Study: Conflict Minerals Legislation
The conflict minerals provision of Dodd–Frank encourages
corporate social responsibility through the hybrid of threatened

Mark Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States,
102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993).
40. Ruth V. Aguilera, Deborah E. Rupp, Cynthia A. Williams & Jyoti Ganapathi,
Putting the S Back in Corporate Social Responsibility: A Multilevel Theory of Social Change in
Organizations, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 836 (2007).
41. Thomas W. Dunfee, Corporate Governance in a Market with Morality, 62 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 150 (1999); see also Kevin T. Jackson, Global Corporate Governance:
Soft Law and Reputational Accountability, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 41, 67–68 (2010) (discussing
extensively “soft-law” or “civil business regulation” that utilizes “private, nonstate, and
market-based regulatory regimes” to incentivize corporate social responsibility).
42. See Dunfee, supra note 41, at 150 (discussing the relevant market constituencies
which the corporation is obligated to appease).
43. See Nobel, supra note 39, at 1258–59; Roe, supra note 39, at 1928; Case Study:
Corporate Social Responsibility in the US, supra note 9.
44. See About the OECD, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/ (last visited June 6,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/Z5FK-W28H; Members and Partners, OECD, http://www.o
ecd.org/about/membersandpartners/ (last visited June 6, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/D2
NB-CQ9H.
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regulatory action as well as market forces.45 Although the provision
likely will bring about an increase in corporate social responsibility in
the form of increased transparency in supply chains, it is debatable
whether the larger goal of the legislative provision will be reached.
1. Background
In 2010, Congress passed a provision of Dodd–Frank aimed at
curbing violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) through
the reduction of trade in conflict minerals.46 Specifically, section 1502 of
Dodd–Frank states that Congress recognizes that perpetrators of
extreme human rights violations are funded by control of mineral mines
in the eastern region of the DRC;47 therefore, to cut off the funding to
the rebel groups perpetrating crime, Congress mandated that all
issuers48 must disclose to the Securities and Exchange Commission
45. Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213–18 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012)). The term “conflict mineral” is defined to mean “(A)
columbite-tantalite (coltan) [also known as tantalum], cassiterite [also known as tin ore], gold,
wolframite [also known as tungsten], or their derivatives; or (B) any other mineral or its
derivatives determined by the Secretary of State to be financing conflict in the [DRC] or an
adjoining country.” Id. § 1502(e)(4) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(5)).
46. Id. § 1502(a).
47. The text of section 1502 makes explicit the congressional goal of the provision:
It is the sense of Congress that the exploitation and trade of conflict minerals
originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is helping to finance conflict
characterized by extreme levels of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of
the Congo, particularly sexual- and gender-based violence, and contributing to an
emergency humanitarian situation therein, warranting the provisions of section
13(p) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as added by subsection (b).
Id.
48. “Issuer” is defined under Rule 13p-1, which states:
Every registrant that files reports with the Commission under Sections 13(a)
(15 U.S.C. 78m(a)) or 15(d) (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)) of the Exchange Act, having conflict
minerals that are necessary to the functionality or production of a product
manufactured or contracted by that registrant to be manufactured, shall file a report
on Form SD within the period specified in that Form disclosing the information
required by the applicable items of Form SD as specified in that Form (17 CFR
249b.400).
17 C.F.R. § 240.13p-1 (2014). This rule, therefore, applies to every issuer required to file
reports under either Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), including voluntary filers, who must
comply. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act Frequently Asked
Questions: Conflict Minerals, SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (last modified May 2,
2014), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/conflictminerals-faq.htm, archived at
http://perma.cc/K8UH-6ARE. Furthermore, an issuer must file a disclosure on its behalf as
well as the subsidiaries included in its consolidated financials. Id. Mining activities are
specifically excluded from the rule because they are not viewed as falling within the definition
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(SEC) whether their products contain conflict minerals mined in the
DRC or an adjoining country.49
Thus, to comply with this disclosure requirement concerning conflict
minerals, companies with SEC reporting requirements50 must perform
varying levels of supply chain due diligence to ascertain whether their
products contain conflict minerals.51 Notably, whether the company
actually uses conflict minerals is irrelevant to the SEC. There is no
penalty for use of conflict minerals but rather for failing to disclose the
use of conflict minerals.52 In other words, the conflict mineral disclosure
requirement is simply a dissemination of information—a “name and
shame” provision.
2. Disclosure Without Regulatory Sanction
Because the conflict mineral provision requires merely disclosure
and not any change in corporate sourcing practices, the practical effect
of the provision is that the market will provide the pressure to force
corporate social responsibility on the issue of conflict minerals.
Granted, companies will have to undertake extensive due diligence on
their supply chains in order to comply with the provision, but the
of “manufacturing.” Id. This exclusion includes the mining of lower grade gold ore, as well as
the ancillary activities of mining, such as “transporting the mined ore to a processing facility;
crushing and milling the ore; mixing crushed/milled ore with cyanide solution; floating
cyanide mixture through a leaching circuit; extracting gold from a leached circuit; [s]melting
leached gold . . . into ingots or bars . . . ; and transporting the [ingots or bars]” to a refinery for
refining. Id.
49. Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502(b)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 1376, 2213–14
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A)). “Adjoining countries” include Angola,
Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania,
Uganda, and Zambia. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(5)).
50. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A), (2).
51. If the conflict minerals in use originated in the DRC or an adjoining country, the
disclosing party must submit a report to the SEC that includes: (i) a description of the due
diligence process undertaken by the disclosing party, which must be independently audited,
with regard to the source and chain of custody of those conflict minerals; and (ii) a description
of the products manufactured or contracted to be manufactured that are not “DRC conflict
free,” the identity of the independent auditor of the source and supply chain, the facilities that
process the conflict minerals used by the disclosing party, the country from which the conflict
minerals were obtained, and the efforts used to determine the origin (i.e., the specific mine)
of the conflict mineral. Id. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). For a product to be considered “DRC
conflict free,” the product must not contain minerals that finance, directly or indirectly, any
armed groups in the DRC or adjoining countries. Id. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(ii).
52. See Jessica Holzer, Retailers Fight to Escape ‘Conflict Minerals’ Law, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 2, 2010, at B1; Jessica Holzer, SEC Proposes ‘Conflict Mineral’ Report, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 16, 2010, at B9.
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ultimate presence of conflict minerals in their products does not warrant
any legal sanction.53 In other words, given the fact that the conflict
minerals provision is a mere “name and shame” statute, the market,
rather than the government, is the force asserting pressure on
companies to responsibly source the four minerals listed in the conflict
minerals provision of Dodd–Frank.
Thus, the efficacy of the provision and the potential impact on
corporate social responsibility turns on the public consciousness and
reaction to learning that certain corporations have products that contain
conflict minerals. This, of course, assumes that not only investors but
the public at large will review the companies’ websites or SEC
disclosures to learn whether a particular company has made a conflict
mineral disclosure.54
In this way, the mandated corporate social responsibility structure
related to conflict minerals is a hybrid model of both disclosure and
market force. The consumer demand for conflict-free products,
however, should not be underestimated and has already caused a
number of multinational corporations to advertise their products as
conflict-free.55
53. FIDEL BAFILEMBA, TIMO MUELLER & SASHA LEZHNEV, THE IMPACT OF DODD–
FRANK AND CONFLICT MINERALS REFORMS ON EASTERN CONGO’S CONFLICT 1–2 (2014),
http://www.enoughproject.org/reports/impact-dodd-frank-and-conflict-minerals-reforms-easte
rn-congo%E2%80%99s-war, archived at http://perma.cc/5KGY-NKYS.
Ostensibly, a
company can disclose the use of conflict minerals to the SEC, publish the disclosure on the
company website, and cross its fingers hoping that there is no public backlash that affects its
bottom line or its brand. In this situation, the corporate social responsibility initiative
underlying the statutory provision ultimately falls flat. There remains, however, the risk of
penalty for any misstatement made in the conflict minerals disclosure. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2014). The risk is a potential penalty from the regulatory agency, the SEC, as well as
potential shareholder liability. See id. Because the conflict minerals disclosure is “filed” with
the SEC, as opposed to merely “furnished,” as it was originally proposed, shareholders are
able to bring lawsuits based on any misstatement in a corporate filing. In addition, Rule 10b5 provides a private right of action to shareholders injured in the sale or purchase of a security
by false or misleading statements made by corporate insiders. See id. Rule 10b-5 is one of the
strongest weapons in the SEC’s arsenal because it applies to all corporate statements and not
just filings. Id. The threat of 10b-5 liability alone is sufficient to pressure a company to
comply with any statutorily required disclosures.
54. The SEC regulations require promulgation of the conflict mineral disclosure on the
corporate website, as well as in a filing with the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A), (E).
55. Intel, for example, had been specifically targeted for the way in which it has handled
its stance on this legislation and was forced to analyze its supply chain. See Suzanna
Fallender, Intel’s Statement on Conflict Minerals Issue, INTEL (May 19, 2010), available at
http://blogs.intel.com/csr/2010/05/intels_statement_on_conflict_m.php, archived at http://perm
a.cc/Z5TC-3DDY. Intel initially deleted critical comments on its Facebook page made by
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Non-governmental organizations and other advocacy groups have
been lobbying both regulators and consumers in order to create
increased demand for products that do not contain conflict minerals.56
As a result, the market is shifting in favor of both compliance with the
statutory provision, and increased corporate social responsibility and
transparency in supply chains.
In sum, regulations aim to give effect to government goals, including
in the area of corporate social responsibility. The alternative to
regulation in advancing these goals is incentivization, considered next.
III. INCENTIVIZING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR
Incentivizing behavior has much precedence, particularly in the tax
law.57 There are several methods by which to use tax law to achieve
activists over its stance on the conflict mineral legislation. Jonathan Hutson, Intel Freaks Out,
Shuts Off Human Rights Protest on Facebook, ENOUGH PROJECT (May 19, 2010), http://www
.enoughproject.org/blogs/intel-freaks-out-shuts-human-rights-protest-facebook, archived at ht
tp://perma.cc/F3WQ-TN24. After reinstating the deleted comments, Intel released a
statement that said, “For well over a year, we have been engaged in both conversations with
NGOs and our own industry focused on creating workable solutions. We have shared with
our suppliers our current position on the issue. . . . We also support the objective of US
legislation to address this problem.” Fallender, supra (citation omitted). Intel now is
heralded by NGOs for being fully onboard with using only conflict-free minerals in its
products.
56. See, e.g., Conflict Minerals, ENOUGH PROJECT, http://www.enoughproject.org/confli
cts/eastern_congo/conflict-minerals#Our_Initiatives (last visited June 6, 2015), archived at htt
p://perma.cc/E9KZ-6GSW. One of the most vocal non-governmental organizations has been
The Enough Project, which regularly promulgates information regarding which companies
have taken steps to ensure their products do not contain conflict minerals. See, e.g., 2012
Conflict Minerals Company Rankings, RAISE HOPE FOR CONGO, http://www.raisehopeforco
ngo.org/content/conflict-minerals-company-rankings-0 (last visited June 6, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/VD9M-N3SR. In other words, The Enough Project is expanding the reach of
the disclosure information in hopes of affecting the market and pressuring companies into
compliance.
57. For example, the Reagan administration developed tax incentives for corporate
giving. The purpose was to shift the burden of providing certain social services to the
charitable sector. Nancy J. Knauer, Reinventing Government: The Promise of Institutional
Choice and Government Created Charitable Organizations, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 945, 959
(1997). But see Peter Dobkin Hall, Business Giving and Social Investment in the United States,
1790–1995, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 789, 816–17 (1997) (“The decline of corporate social
responsibility policies and practices after the mid-1980s can be attributed not only to the
failure of political liberalism, but to the inability of the proponents of business giving and
social investment to articulate persuasive rationales for such activities. Tax incentives proved
insufficient to fuel large-scale corporate commitments (as Hayden Smith’s 1983 study shows,
companies with deep commitments to social responsibility often contributed at levels greater
than could be justified by tax savings, while companies lacking such commitments did not
bother to take advantage of potential savings).”).
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certain congressional goals. It is true that tax law may be used to collect
and redistribute the revenues to address corporate social responsibility
concerns, which does not amount to an incentive because the result will
be the same no matter how the corporation behaves: the corporation
will be taxed and the taxation revenue will be redistributed.58 However,
tax law can also be used to penalize certain actions, which incentivizes
actors to avoid the penalties.59 Alternatively, tax law may be used to
incentivize desirable corporate behavior through credits and deductions
that allow corporations to minimize their tax liability, which will be the
focus of this Part. Such tax incentives may be necessary to supplement
the inherent incentives that exist in the corporate structure, which are
considered first.
A. Incentives Inherent to Corporate Structure
There are certain incentives inherent to the corporate framework,
many of which result from the corporate duty to maximize profits.
Profits may be maximized by adding value to the company’s brand,
appealing to consumers, avoiding regulation, remaining in good
standing with the local community, and developing a particular
corporate culture to attract employees.60 Many of these methods for
profit maximization are advanced by engaging in corporate social
responsibility.

58. For a discussion on this topic, see Williams, supra note 35, at 740–50.
59. For example, the Affordable Care Act contains a tax penalty for applicable large
employers who fail to offer full-time employees enrollment in qualifying employer-sponsored
health coverage, and individuals face a mandate that requires that most Americans obtain
health insurance or pay a tax penalty. 26 U.S.C. §§ 480H, 5000A; see, e.g., JESSICA BANTHIN,
ALEXANDRA MINICOZZI, HOLLY HARVEY & SARAH ANDERS, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
PAYMENTS OF PENALTIES FOR BEING UNINSURED UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
(2012), available at https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/09-19-12-Indiv_Mandate_Penalty.p
df, archived at https://perma.cc/FK36-EQ2V; HINDA CHAIKIND & CHRIS L. PETERSON,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41159, SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL EMPLOYER PENALTIES
UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (PPACA) (2010),
available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/health/employerpenalties.pdf, archived at http://pe
rma.cc/33CT-8C2Y; David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax Provisions of
Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms Are Needed to Prevent Avoidable Costs to Lowand Moderate-Income Workers, 65 TAX L. REV. 669, 692–700 (2012). In the child labor
context, Congress had attempted to penalize employers using child labor with a 10% tax, but
the United States Supreme Court invalidated this tax, holding it to be an invalid exercise of
the taxing power, which the Court suspected to be a penalty. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.,
259 U.S. 20 (1922).
60. See Chatterji & Richman, supra note 2, at 33; Ribstein, supra note 10, at 1433–34.
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This inherent incentive to engage in corporate social responsibility
stems from the reality that, while corporations are not human, their
customers are—the recognition of which has driven many corporations
to cater to people’s desires and preferences as a method of recruiting
their business and avoiding boycotts.61 In this way, incentives act as the
converse of the threat of negative market reaction, as discussed in Part
II.C.
For example, corporations seek to increase their bottom lines
through public perception of responsibility.62 The availability of
external markers of their corporate social responsibility, such as Fortune
magazine’s “Corporate Social Responsibility” rankings, incentivizes
them to perform well on such rankings.63 These corporate rankings,
however, have their shortcomings: companies may misrepresent the
extent of their social contributions and it is difficult to establish useful
metrics of social responsibility.64 Nonetheless, they have the ability to
influence public perception and, therefore, the demand for the
corporation’s products.
Thus, businesses and corporations have begun to pursue corporate
social responsibility under the theory that corporate social responsibility

61. See Chatterji & Richman, supra note 2, at 33, 48. “All successful companies aim to
meet the demands of consumers, and to some degree enjoy a capability to detect and respond
to market preferences.” Id. at 48. For example, “In the face of actual and threatened
boycotts and consumer activism, Nike improved its labor practices and Pepsi withdrew from
Burma.” Diane L. Fahey, Can Tax Policy Stop Human Trafficking?, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 345,
381 (2009); see also Jonathan Todres, Moving Upstream: The Merits of a Public Health Law
Approach to Human Trafficking, 89 N.C. L. REV. 447, 505 n.265 (2011). For a review of the
Nike litigation, see Vicki McIntyre, Note, Nike v. Kasky: Leaving Corporate America
Speechless, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1531 (2004).
62. See Chatterji & Richman, supra note 2, at 48–49; Fahey, supra note 61, at 381.
63. Metcalf, supra note 3, at 196 (suggesting that Fortune magazine’s “Corporate Social
Responsibility” rankings may encourage large global companies to engage in corporate social
responsibility). But see id. at 191 (“Walmart, as a laggard in the 2004–2006 sample, may not
be ‘disciplined’ by the market if improvements in its ranking would require it to abandon its
business model based on highly competitive labor conditions, and instead involve labor as a
stakeholder and promote collective bargaining.”). The author concedes that “Walmart has
moved from its ‘laggard’ position at the bottom of the ranking in more recent surveys.” Id. at
191 n.144.
64. Chatterji & Richman, supra note 2, at 34. For example, Working Mother magazine
listed Morgan Stanley in its “100 Best Employers for Working Moms” shortly before Morgan
Stanley paid $54 million to settle a sex discrimination lawsuit. Id. at 34 n.7.
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is good for business.65 It has even become a strategy taught in business
schools.66
However, it is unclear whether and to what exact extent these
inherent incentives exist because it remains unclear whether corporate
social responsibility metrics predict financial performance.67 To the
extent that they do not, additional incentives, such as tax incentives, are
useful.
B. Tax Incentives
One of the most effective ways to incentivize behavior is through the
tax law.68 Although most states have a state corporate tax as well,69 this
Article limits itself to federal taxation.70
There is a strong case that tax law can incentivize individuals to act
in a particular way,71 but the case is particularly strong in the corporate
65. See Ronen Shamir, Corporate Social Responsibility: Towards a New MarketEmbedded Morality?, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 371 (2008).
66. Id. at 392 (“[B]usiness schools around the world are now offering programs and
classes that are based on the business-case approach to social responsibility, encourage
research and theoretical models which explore the economic incentives for moral
performance, and measure the business value of being ‘morally right.’”).
67. “More than 100 studies have examined whether corporate social responsibility
(CSR) metrics predict financial performance, with a variety of results . . . .” Aaron K.
Chatterji, David I. Levine & Michael W. Toffel, How Well Do Social Ratings Actually
Measure Corporate Social Responsibility?, 18 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 125, 128 (2009);
see also Hall, supra note 57, at 794 (“All CEOs understand the public relations value of
giving. Most also appreciate the tax savings that can come from the deductibility of
contributions. However, few regard giving to be in any way related to profitmaking . . . .”).
68. “Tax avoidance is as American as apple pie. Each year, individuals, families, and
businesses alter their behavior in ways meant to decrease their federal, state, or local tax
liabilities.” Jeremy M. Wilson, Recent Development, Statutory Interpretation in Wal-Mart
Stores East, Inc. v. Hinton and Why North Carolina Courts Should Apply Anti-Tax
Avoidance Judicial Doctrines in Future Cases, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1471, 1471 (2010) (footnote
omitted).
69. Rick Geisenberger, The Delaware Corporation Franchise Tax, DEL. LAW., Fall
2012, at 18, 20. For a history of corporate taxation, see Philip T. Hackney, What We Talk
About When We Talk About Tax Exemption, 33 VA. TAX REV. 115 (2013).
70. But see Ruth Mason, Delegating Up: State Conformity with the Federal Tax Base, 62
DUKE L.J. 1267, 1269 (2013) (arguing that “federal tax incentives also affect the states
because most states incorporate federal definitions of income into their own tax laws”).
71. For the argument that economic incentives drive women’s behavior, see Edward J.
McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code,
40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1033, 1040–41 (1993) (arguing that Congress should lower married
women’s tax rates to encourage both marriage and married women’s participation in the
labor force); see also EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 19–23 (1997) (noting that,
because married couples often view the wife’s income as supplemental, which is taxed at
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context given the sophistication of corporations, which benefit from
extensive legal advice in order to minimize taxes.72 Incentivizing
corporate behavior through the taxation system is therefore an area of
significant opportunity for legislators.
There are several ways to incentivize behavior through the taxation
system: by providing (1) a tax deduction that reduces taxable income73
or (2) a tax credit that reduces tax liability dollar-for-dollar.74 Congress
has employed both methods to incentivize certain corporate behavior, in
addition to exemptions such as the payroll tax exemption.75
For example, Congress has used tax credits to encourage companies
to hire certain groups of people in order to boost their employment
rates. Specifically, the Work Opportunity Tax Credit provides a tax
credit for hiring people from certain target groups that have consistently

higher marginal rates, the tax code provides a disincentive for married women to work), and
Jennifer L. Venghaus, Comment, Tax Incentives: A Means of Encouraging Research and
Development for Homeland Security?, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1213, 1220 (2003) (suggesting that
the tax code can change society’s behavior). However, other scholars have suggested that the
tax code does not influence people’s behavior but that people’s behavior influences the tax
code. See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV.
1389, 1392 (1975) (suggesting that the tax code codifies social mores); Erik M. Jensen,
Jonathan Barry Forman, Making America Work, 5 PITT. TAX REV. 165, 170 n.16 (2008) (book
review) (suggesting that the tax code is indifferent to whether the husband or wife is the
primary wage-earner but that social expectations may be more sexist).
72. See Mark J. Cowan, A GAAP Critic’s Guide to Corporate Income Taxes, 66 TAX
LAW. 209, 232 (2012) (“Policymakers also understand the motivation of corporate managers
to minimize taxes and rely on corporate managers to respond to incentives to engage in
certain activities—such as investing in new equipment or research and development—put in
the tax law.”).
73. “An example [on tax deductions] may be helpful here. Assume . . . A . . . [has] paid
$1000 under [a] local property tax. Taxpayer A is an itemizer whose income places him in a
15% marginal rate bracket . . . . Because A is able to take the [$1000] deduction, A will not
have to pay $150 in income tax. A’s property tax expense has been subsidized by the federal
treasury . . . .” Mildred Wigfall Robinson, It Takes A Federalist Village: A Revitalized
Property Tax as the Linchpin for Stable, Effective K-12 Public Education Funding, 17 RICH.
J.L. & PUB. INT. 549, 582 (2014).
74. “Unlike an income tax deduction, a credit is taken after tentative federal income tax
liability has been determined. It is a dollar-for-dollar reduction of federal tax liability that
would otherwise be borne.” Id. at 583.
75. For an excellent review of international tax incentives for corporate social
responsibility, see Jeyapalan Kasipillai & Shanthy Rachagan, Tax Incentives and Corporate
Social Responsibility (presented at the International Congress on Innovation and Regional
Economic Development at the University of Science and Technology of China, Dec. 2–4,
2012), available at http://congress.ustc.edu.cn/pro/2_.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3JJRSQ3U (reviewing tax incentives for corporate social responsibility in Australia, Canada,
China, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom).
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faced significant barriers to employment, such as Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF) recipients and food stamp recipients.76
The Indian Employment Tax Credit, meanwhile, incentivizes
businesses to spur employment on Native American reservations by
providing a credit if a qualified employee, such as someone who is an
enrolled member of a Native American tribe or the spouse of such a
member, is hired and performs substantially all of her services within a
Native American reservation. The person also must have her main
home on or near that reservation.77
In the wake of the 2007 recession that produced an unemployment
rate that hovered at 9%,78 the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment
(HIRE) Act of 2010 included a payroll tax exemption for hiring
unemployed people, as well as an increased business tax credit, totaling
billions of dollars in tax breaks.79 This group of tax incentives aims to
help secure employment for potentially disadvantaged categories of
Americans.
Many tax credits also aim to support the hiring of former members
of the military. For example, the Activated Military Reservist Tax
Credit rewards employers with fifty or fewer employees with a
maximum credit of $4,000 for every employee who is a National Guard
member or Reservist and whose wages are paid while away on active
duty for more than thirty days.80 The Wounded Warrior Tax Credit
76. 26 U.S.C. § 51(a), (d) (2012); see also Work Opportunity Tax Credit, U.S. DEP’T OF
LAB. EMP. & TRAINING ADMIN., http://www.doleta.gov/business/incentives/opptax/ (last
updated Apr. 30, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3ENZ-W7QX.
77. 26 U.S.C. § 45A; see also DEP’T OF THE TREASURY INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
PUBLICATION 954: TAX INCENTIVES FOR DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES 26 (2004), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p954--2004.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/K56W-P92H. For
an overview of taxation and Native American issues, see Mark J. Cowan, Double Taxation in
Indian Country: Unpacking the Problem and Analyzing the Role of the Federal Government in
Protecting Tribal Government Revenues, 2 PITT. TAX REV. 93 (2005).
78. See, e.g., Andrew J. Kazakes, Developments in the Law, Protecting Absent
Stakeholders in Foreclosure Litigation: The Foreclosure Crisis, Mortgage Modification, and
State Court Responses, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1383, 1393 & n.42 (2010); Labor Force Statistics
from the Current Population Survey, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., http://dat
a.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 (last visited June 7, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/Z3Y
N-XJAT.
79. Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No.111-147, §§ 101, 102, 124
Stat. 71, 72–76 (2010).
80. 26 U.S.C. § 45P; see also CTR. FOR AM., 2013 FEDERAL TAX BENEFITS FOR HIRING
AND EMPLOYING QUALIFIED VETERANS, NATIONAL GUARD MEMBERS AND RESERVISTS
12−13 (2013), available at http://www.centerforamerica.org/pledge/ng/AJAH_2013_Federal_T
ax_Benefits_for_Hiring_Veterans.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5YU6-UTN8.
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provides a tax credit of several thousand dollars to businesses that hire
veterans with service-related disabilities.81 Additionally, “the Returning
Heroes Tax Credit encourages the hiring of unemployed Gulf War-era
II veterans.”82
In addition to these tax incentives for hiring certain groups of
people, there are tax credits to encourage investment in certain
underperforming communities.83 For example, the New Markets Tax
Credit provides a tax credit to individual and corporate investors for
making equity investments in Community Development Entities
(CDEs), which are specialized financial institutions.84 In providing the
tax credit in 2000, Congress aimed to increase investments into
businesses and real estate projects located in low-income communities,
determining that a qualified CDE is any U.S. corporation or partnership
that meets the following criteria: Its “primary mission” is to serve or
provide investment capital for low-income communities or people; it
“maintains accountability to residents of low-income communities
through . . . representation on any” governing or advisory boards of the
entity; and it is certified by the CDFI Fund of the Department of the
Treasury.85
Similarly, the Empowerment Zone and Renewal Community
Employment Tax Credit encourages employers to hire individuals who
work and live in an empowerment zone or a renewal community, both
of which are federal designations for highly distressed areas with high
81. 26 U.S.C. § 51; see also CTR. FOR AM., supra note 80, at 8–11.
82. Marcy L. Karin & Katie Onachila, The Military’s Workplace Flexibility Framework,
3 AM. U. LAB. & EMP. L.F. 153, 178 (2013) (providing a discussion of the legal framework on
hiring former members of the military).
83. Commentators have urged the federal government to focus on this issue. See, e.g.,
Jesse J. Norris, State Efforts to Reduce Racial Disparities in Criminal Justice: Empirical
Analysis and Recommendations for Action, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 493, 500 (2011) (“The need for
greater investment in poor communities . . . is a complex policy question that, despite its
urgency, could be addressed in a number of different ways. Even so, if state-level antidisparities processes are earnestly committed to reducing disparities, they must address this
issue. Unfortunately, this article shows that most of these processes are, in fact, neglecting
the need for more services.”); Jasmin Sethi, Lessons for Social Scientists and Politicians: An
Analysis of Welfare Reform, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 5, 31 (2010) (“[William
Julius Wilson’s] work implied that a substantive change in outcomes required improved social
organization in poor neighborhoods and significant investment in poor communities by the
federal government.”).
84. 26 U.S.C. § 45D.
85. See id.; see also DEP’T OF THE TREASURY INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note
77, at 18; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT 5–6 (2010), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/atgnmtc.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2YUY-VNZS.

2015]

MANDATING VERSUS INCENTIVIZING

1687

levels of poverty and emigration.86 Empowerment zones include
Tucson, Arizona; Cleveland, Ohio; Knoxville, Tennessee; Fresno,
California; and Detroit, Michigan; while renewal communities include
Chicago, Illinois; Atlanta, Georgia; New Orleans, Louisiana; Flint,
Michigan; and Youngstown, Ohio.87
Finally, the Disabled Access Tax Credit provides a non-refundable
credit for small businesses that incur expenditures for providing access
to people with disabilities.88 Eligible expenses include readers for
customers or employees who have trouble with sight, sign language
interpreters for those who are hard of hearing, adaptive equipment,
removal of architectural barriers in facilities or vehicles, and certain fees
for consulting services.89
These are several examples of tax credits being used to incentivize
businesses to act in desirable ways toward certain groups of people and
communities. The other major category of incentives takes the form of
tax deductions. Credits are more favorable to a taxpayer than
deductions because they reduce tax liability dollar for dollar,90 but
deductions also reduce liability.
There have been several deductions offered to corporate taxpayers
to encourage certain behavior.91
For example, the Charitable
Contribution Tax Deduction allows businesses to deduct their charitable
This deduction allows
contributions to qualified organizations.92
businesses to reduce their taxable income by donating funds or property

86. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1400H; see also DEP’T OF THE TREASURY INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., supra note 77, at 3, 8.
87. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 77, at 3–4.
88. 26 U.S.C. § 44; Tax Benefits for Businesses Who Have Employees with Disabilities,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Empl
oyed/Tax-Benefits-for-Businesses-Who-Have-Employees-with-Disabilities (last updated Jan.
13, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/A4H4-G4SK.
89. 26 U.S.C. § 44(c)(2); Tax Incentives for Businesses, MID-ATLANTIC ADA CENTER,
http://www.adainfo.org/content/tax-incentives-businesses (last visited June 7, 2015), archived
at http://perma.cc/9WUA-TWWE.
90. Roberton Williams, Income Tax Issues: What is the Difference Between Tax
Deductions and Tax Credits?, TAX POL’Y CENTER (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.taxpolicycent
er.org/briefing-book/background/issues/credits.cfm, archived at http://perma.cc/M9GA-FRJ3.
91. See supra Part III.B.
92. 26 U.S.C. § 170. Individual taxpayers also benefit from this charitable deduction.
Id.
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to charities.93 Charitable giving is incentivized through tax deductions
on both the business and individual levels.94
Meanwhile, the Architectural Barrier Removal Tax Deduction
incentivizes businesses to remove architectural and transportation
barriers for the elderly and people with disabilities.95 Businesses may
use this deduction in addition to the Disabled Access Credit in the same
tax year if both are applicable.96 If a business avails itself of both the
deduction and the credit, “the deduction is equal to the difference
between the total expenditures and the amount of the credit claimed.”97
Examples of deductible expenditures include those incurred to widen
doors, install ramps, restripe parking lots, and modify vehicles.98
Therefore, many tax incentives exist to encourage certain corporate
behavior that benefits the community. Some of these incentivized
behaviors fall strictly in the corporate social responsibility rubric, others
do so more loosely.99 Either way, they achieve Congressional goals of
directing and shaping certain corporate behavior.
C. Theoretical Justifications
Tax incentives are effective because corporate management has the
responsibility to shareholders to minimize tax liability.100 Scholars have
93. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS 2 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p526.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/JWQ2-57X5.
94. For both individuals and businesses, the tax-expenditure estimate for charitable
deductions in 2009 totaled over $40 billion. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL
PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 301 tbl.19-1
(2009), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2010/assets/sp
ec.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/WV65-Y7VB.
Furthermore, certain non-profit
organizations are exempt from tax. See Brian Galle, Charities in Politics: A Reappraisal, 54
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1561, 1568 (2013).
95. 26 U.S.C. § 190.
96. Tax Benefits for Businesses Who Have Employees with Disabilities, supra note 88.
97. Id.
98. Tax Incentives for Businesses, supra note 89.
99. See supra Part I for examples of corporate social responsibility.
100. See Cowan, supra note 72, at 231–32 (“Any residual tax burden that cannot be
passed on to workers, suppliers, and customers—or other ‘outsiders’—presumably falls on
the shareholders. To keep the shareholders happy, corporate managers must engage in tax
planning to minimize this cost and enhance shareholder value. Indeed, shareholders have
been known to litigate if they perceive that managers have not minimized corporate taxes.”).
But see Linda Sugin, Theories of the Corporation and the Tax Treatment of Corporate
Philanthropy, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 835, 836 (1997) (“The Internal Revenue Code has
fossilized a conception of the corporation as a ‘real entity.’ It generally treats that entity like
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pointed out that this method of encouraging the private sector to engage
in charitable activities the state cannot handle is no less legitimate than
taxing corporations and then regulating corporate social
responsibility.101
To every tax incentive, there is a corresponding cost resulting from
the foregone tax revenue.102
However, unless obtained through
lobbying,103 the cost is borne because of the value placed on the
For example, the charitable giving tax
incentivized behavior.104
incentive has been criticized for its cost, but its continued existence has
been justified by the value placed on charitable giving.105
any other taxable person, but it presumes that the entity is ‘the classic profit maximizer in
collective form.’ According to the tax law, a corporation earns its own income and pays its
own tax. Treating the corporation as a real entity serves important practical goals: it eases
administration and allows form to control the tax consequences of many corporate
transactions, thereby improving predictability for taxpayers. Developments in corporate
theory, however, challenge this conception of the corporation.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting
William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from
History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1490 (1989))).
101. Reuven Avi-Yonah, Taxation, Corporate Social Responsibility, and the Business
Enterprise (Comparative Research in Law & Political Econ., Research Paper 19/2009). AviYonah investigates tax incentives for corporate social responsibility under three different
views of corporations: as an artificial entity, as a real entity, and as a nexus of contracts. Id.
102. “We suspect that few people really oppose all efforts by corporations to minimize
their tax liability or improve their financial appearance—the problem is when they go too
far.” Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Of the Conditional Fee as a Response to Lawyers,
Bankers and Loopholes, 1 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 42, 47, n.17 (2011) (emphasis omitted).
103. Businesses and industries spend many resources lobbying for tax incentives. See,
e.g., Nancy A. McLaughlin, The Role of Land Trusts in Biodiversity Conservation on Private
Lands, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 453, 458 (2002) (“[L]and trusts have been increasingly active in
lobbying for even greater tax incentives to encourage both the donation and sale of
conservation easements, and lawmakers appear to be increasingly receptive to their pleas.”);
Eric Homsi, Comment, Financing Films One State at a Time: A Survey of Successful Film
Incentive Programs, 21 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 149, 151 (2011) (reviewing the
American film and television production industries’ lobbying efforts for “incentives to
prevent further runaway productions and to maintain the industry’s beneficial impact on the
American economy”).
104. One commentator proposed the following framework for evaluating tax incentives:
“If, however, lobbyist-legislator-advocates claim that tax breaks provide a tax incentive, the
tax break must be held to a higher standard: Does the tax incentive help the economy? . . . [It
does] if its economic benefits outweigh its economic costs.” Martin A. Sullivan, Tax
Incentives and Economists, 111 ST. TAX NOTES 20, 26 (2006).
105. See, e.g., Eric M. Zolt, Tax Deductions for Charitable Contributions: Domestic
Activities, Foreign Activities, or None of the Above, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 361, 404 (2012) (“[T]he
current regime for charitable deductions creates value, but perhaps not enough value for its
costs, broadly defined.”); Grace Soyon Lee, Mitigating the Effects of an Economic Downturn
on Charitable Contributions: Facing the Problem and Contemplating Solutions, 22 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 589, 609–612 (2013) (outlining the criticisms of the charitable deduction).
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Similarly, corporate social responsibility is valued and subsidized.
For example, the hiring of certain groups of people is valued to the
extent that its costs are subsidized through the tax code. In other words,
advancing these public policy goals has been deemed worth the
foregone tax revenue.
In this way, the government has been
characterized as a partner in the business by foregoing certain tax
revenues.106
Of course, the effectiveness of the tax incentives requires that
corporations have tax liability that they seek to minimize. This requires
making the important distinction between minimizing tax liability and
tax avoidance.
As corporations endeavor to avoid taxation by
geography or the structure of their transactions, the tax base decreases
and tax incentives become less effective because no tax liability needs to
be minimized.107
However, to the extent that income exists,
corporations will seek to minimize their tax liability and the government
can take advantage of this known goal through tax incentives for certain
corporate behavior.
IV. THE FRAMEWORK ON WHETHER TO LEGISLATE OR INCENTIVIZE
Observers have called for tax incentives and for corporate
regulations for certain corporate behaviors.108
But what is the
framework that should govern whether Congress legislates or
incentivizes behavior?109 Regulation and incentives have different levels

But see Patrick E. Tolan, Jr., Compromising the Safety Net: How Limiting Tax Deductions for
High-Income Donors Could Undermine Charitable Organizations, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
329 (2013) (noting the importance of the charitable deduction to giving).
106. Cowan, supra note 72, at 237 (reviewing the literature likening the government to a
shareholder by virtue of its right to a share of corporate revenue through taxation). “But the
government’s position is different from that of private shareholders in at least seven ways.”
Id.
107. For a history of corporate taxation and the ways in which corporations seek to
avoid it, see John T. VanDenburgh, Note, Closing International Loopholes: Changing the
Corporate Tax Base to Effectively Combat Tax Avoidance, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 313 (2012); see
also Joann M. Weiner, An Economist’s View of Income Allocation Under the Arm’s Length
Standard and Under Formulary Appointment, in THE STATE AND LOCAL TAX LAWYER —
2009/10 SYMPOSIUM EDITION, at 25, 29 (2013) (“To minimize their overall tax liability,
multinational corporations have an incentive to attribute income to low-tax jurisdictions and
to attribute expenses to high-tax jurisdictions.”).
108. E.g., Arthur Acevedo, Responsible Profitability? Not On My Balance Sheet!, 61
CATH. U. L. REV. 651, 693–95 (2012).
109. Id. at 693 (arguing that Congress should use tax law to encourage corporations to
engage in socially responsible behavior, specifically related to products liability).
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of effectiveness depending on the desired behavior. Also, the nature of
the desired corporate behavior may preclude regulation, leaving
incentives as the best method of achieving such behavior. These issues
are considered next.
A. Legality
There are certain corporate behaviors not amenable to regulation.
These areas are the easiest candidates for tax incentives, which are the
only way to achieve desired corporate behavior if regulation is not
possible.
For example, while corporations may not discriminate, they cannot
be told whom to hire.110 This is clear territory where tax incentives may
fill the legislative gap necessarily in existence. Accordingly, several tax
incentives exist to hire from certain groups of people.111
Similarly, government cannot legislate in which geographical areas a
corporation must hire. In fact, there arises competition among
jurisdictions to attract business through their tax law.112 Again, this is
where tax incentives fill the legislative void,113 and tax incentives have
arisen to encourage hiring from certain communities.114
Government also cannot legislate where businesses invest their
money, short of taxing them and redistributing the tax revenues. On the
other hand, government can incentivize companies through tax law to
invest in certain underperforming geographical areas. This is the reason
for tax incentives that encourage businesses to invest in certain areas,
110. See Employers and the ADA: Myth and Facts, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. OFFICE OF
DISABILITY EMP. POL’Y, http://www.dol.gov/odep/pubs/fact/ada.htm (last visited June 7,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/966F-X3GD. There is a network of federal laws preventing
discrimination in hiring, including the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex, as well as The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) that prohibits discrimination against
people over 40 years old. For further information on these laws and others enforced by the
federal government, see Laws Enforced by EEOC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/ (last visited June 7, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/F3QA-95GJ.
111. See supra Part III.B.
112. The competition among the states for filmmaking business is an example. See, e.g.,
Schuyler M. Moore, The Future of Money, L.A. LAW., May 2013, at 20, 26 (“The most
important development in film financing over the last decade is the drastic expansion of state
tax credits for film production. Revelations used this approach to obtain New York tax
credits for The Magic of Belle Isle.”).
113. See supra Part III.B.
114. See supra Part III.B.
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such as the Empowerment Zone and Renewal Community Employment
Tax Credit.115
Increasing accessibility to people with disabilities is an area where
Congress has chosen to both legislate and incentivize behavior.
Specifically, while Congress has legislated certain minimal standards of
accessibility for people with disabilities, further accommodations are
incentivized through the tax law, such as the Disabled Access Tax
Credit.116 This increases the response to the issue.
There are also plenty of areas where Congress may legislate, but
such legislation may be out of place. This may be the case of conflict
minerals. Specifically, a sole humanitarian provision in the context of
financial reform such as Dodd–Frank seems inconsistent. Moreover,
the stated aim of the conflict minerals provision is a reduction in
violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo,117 yet Congress requires
only mere disclosure by companies with reporting requirements to the
SEC and no actual penalty for use of conflict minerals.118 In other
words, the conflict mineral legislation, while ambitious in shaping
corporate social responsibility, likely will not be able to produce a
measurable effect on its underlying goal of reducing violence in the
DRC. While market forces could pressure companies into acting
responsibly, it is possible that Congress would have gotten more buy-in
and participation from both public and private corporations if it had
offered tax incentives rather than regulations tied to SEC reporting
requirements.
B. Effectiveness
No doubt, there are frequent breaches of corporate social
responsibility, especially when corporate social responsibility is neither
regulated nor incentivized.119 Many of these breaches result from the

115. See supra Part III.B.
116. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
For example, the 1973
Rehabilitation Act, section 504, requires a recipient of federal funds to “make reasonable
accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
handicapped applicant or employee unless the . . . accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of [the employer’s] program or activity.” 34 C.F.R. § 104.12(b)
(2011).
117. Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2213 (2010).
118. Id. § 1502(b)(1)(A) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A) (2012).
119. See Craig Mackenzie, Boards, Incentives and Corporate Social Responsibility: The
Case for a Change of Emphasis, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 935 (2007) (drawing
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nature of the corporate framework, which pursues maximization of
profits. This has certain lessons for the effectiveness of regulation
versus incentives.
Corporations seek to circumvent regulations if the regulations
conflict with profit maximization, as they often do.120
When
corporations are effective in dodging regulations, they are able to
undermine the intent of the regulations. One way to avoid this effect is
to incentivize particular behavior instead of regulating it.
Corporations also seek to circumvent taxes,121 which is why
opportunities to lower tax burdens through tax incentives are effective.
Whereas it is difficult to harness corporate avoidance of regulations into
productive results, it is easy to harness corporate avoidance of taxes by
offering tax incentives.
A major exception to the corporation’s primary duty to maximize
profits for shareholders122 is the case wherein the shareholders value
corporate social responsibility in itself.123 There has been some
movement toward socially responsible investing, where investors buy
stock based in part on the company’s record in the social, ethical,

upon economic theories to analyze the primary causes of breaches of corporate social
responsibility).
120. “[C]orporations have a strong inclination to resist, co-opt, or preempt government
directives, and . . . the spread of economic globalization has made it even easier for
corporations to avoid governments altogether.” Chatterji & Richman, supra note 2, at 41; see
also Hill & Painter, supra note 102, at 42 (noting that “loophole lawyering” makes regulating
corporations difficult).
121. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Clayton, 147 S.E.2d 522, 529 (N.C. 1966) (“[E]xploring
ways [for the corporation] to minimize taxes is as much a part of its business as exploring for
new sources of oil.”); see also Cowan, supra note 72, at 235 (“Given the high stakes and high
profile of tax planning—especially effective tax rate planning—corporations spend billions
on in-house tax departments and tax consulting advice.”).
122. See Chatterji & Richman, supra note 2, at 34 (arguing that advocates of corporate
social responsibilities need to remember the function of the corporation). But see Susan S.
Kuo & Benjamin Means, Corporate Social Responsibility After Disaster, 89 WASH. U. L. REV.
973, 977 (2012) (arguing that the “standard story concerning corporate social responsibility is
incomplete because it features only the largest, publicly traded corporations” and not “closely
held, locally owned businesses, whether corporations, LLCs, or even franchise establishments
with owners who reside in the community”).
123. “Managers can promote shareholders’ interests without maximizing profits to the
extent the shareholders have some objective other than profit maximization.” Ribstein, supra
note 10, at 1433. The question also is to what extent is society’s interests consistent with those
of shareholders? Id.
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environmental, or political realms.124 Nonetheless, the significant
number, turnover, and anonymity of shareholders of public
corporations, whose stock trades on an exchange, result in the operation
of the assumption that shareholders want maximum profit. This has
prompted debate over whether corporate social responsibility is even
possible. Indeed, “[f]or centuries legal, political, social, and economic
commentators have debated corporate social responsibility ad
nauseam.”125
V. CONCLUSION
With the choice of whether to incentivize or regulate corporate
behavior, legislators must decide how to achieve certain desirable
behavior. This question arises often in the context of corporate social
responsibility. This Article has proposed a framework in which to make
these types of decisions, evaluating examples of both approaches.
Ultimately, the decision whether to legislate certain corporate
behavior or incentivize it depends on whether regulation is even
possible and, if it is, whether it would be effective. The subject of the
regulation or incentive helps determine which method would be possible
and effective. For example, certain subjects are beyond the scope of
regulation—such as where or whom a corporation may hire—and
certain subjects are unusual for regulation. These are ideal areas for
incentivizing corporate behavior to achieve desired corporate behavior.

124. Siebecker, supra note 18, at 623. Siebecker cites the public’s willingness to pay a
premium for “socially sound business practices” as a monetary incentive for corporations to
engage in corporate social responsibility. Id. at 624.
125. Butler & McChesney, supra note 1, at 1195 (emphasis omitted).

